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The problems began shortly after the birth of her first child:
depression, crying jags brought on by little annoyances, inexplicable
feelings of guilt, a feeling that she no longer belonged in her body, and
periods of compulsive over-eating.1 Jill no longer wanted her husband
to touch her and was overcome with feelings of repulsion whenever he
initiated intimate contact.
Determined to overcome these problems, Jill began therapy. After
a number of sessions, Jill's therapist asked if she had ever been sexually
1. E. SUE BLUME, SECRET SURVIVORS: UNCOVERING INCEST AND ITS AFTEREFFECTS IN
WOMEN xviii (Survivor's Checklist) (1990).
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abused as a child. Jill was shocked and angered by the suggestion; she
came from a "good" family. Her parents were upper middle class,
college educated, and active in their community. Jill remembered
family picnics, Christmas dinners, and backyard football games.
Generally, she felt feelings of love and security when she recalled her
childhood. Jill and her siblings had completed their college educations
and were now married, with children of their own.2
The more Jill attempted to deny the suggestion that she had been
abused, however, the more she was convinced that her therapist's
suggestion might explain her inability to function properly. She read
"The Courage to Heal,"'3 a book recommended by her therapist. She
was profoundly struck by the following passages:
If you are unable to remember any specific instances .. .but still
have a feeling that something abusive happened to you, it probably
did;4 If you think you were abused and your life shows the symp-
toms, then you were;5 If you don't remember your abuse you are not
alone. Many women don't have memories, and some never get
2. "Jill's" story is a composite taken from the results of questionnaires sent by the False
Memory Syndrome Foundation (a tax-exempt institute, located at 3508 Market Street, Suite 128,
Philadelphia, PA 19104), to people whose adult children have accused them of recently recovered
memories of repressed childhood sexual abuse. The results were cited in a recent article. Hollida
Wakefield & Ralph Underwager, Recovered Memories of Alleged Sexual Abuse: Lawsuits Against
Parents, 10 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 483 (1992).
Wakefield and Underwager acknowledge that the individuals who responded to the
questionnaires did not represent a random sample and that the information was provided by the
accused parents and not the child. However, the authors note that the questionnaires represent
the first data available regarding families, parents, and adult children where there are allegations of
recovered memories of sexual abuse. Id. at 486.
The preliminary questionnaire data reflects functional, successful families with annual
median family incomes of $60,000-$69,000; four-fifths of the parents are still married and judge
their marriages to be happy; two-thirds of the fathers and one-half of the mothers have
undergraduate or graduate degrees; the majority of the families reports having eaten dinner
together as a family, going on family vacations, and being actively involved with their children
while they were growing up. The accusing children are also highly educated (over one-fourth
have graduate degrees, bachelor degrees or some college), ninety percent are female, and only one-
third had psychological or psychiatric treatment prior to adulthood. The questionnaire results
also indicate that in almost all cases (where the parents had knowledge of the therapy program),
the therapists utilized a book by Ellen Bass & Laura Davis, THE COURAGE TO HEAL (1988),
along with other survivor or self-help books. The therapists, approximately three-fourths of
whom were female, are identified as social workers (24%), psychologists (33%), psychiatrists (8%)
and counselors (33%). Over one-half of the female therapists were between the ages of 30 and 39,
while the majority of male therapists were over the age of 40. Wakefield & Underwager, supra, at
486.
In 85% of the cases, siblings did not make allegations and in three-fourths of the cases,
siblings did not believe that the allegations made by the accusing child were true. Id.
3. ELLEN BAss & LAURA DAVIS, THE COURAGE TO HEAL (1988).
4. Id. at 21.
5. Id. at 22.
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memories. This doesn't mean they weren't abused;6 and, Of course
.. demands for proof are unreasonable. You are not responsible for
proving that you were abused.'
Jill returned to her therapist and shortly thereafter, she began hav-
ing nightmares involving a shadowy male figure. Jill would waken
with a feeling of having been sexually threatened. The figure soon took
on the face of her father and, with the help of her therapist, Jill began to
recall a period of abuse spanning at least five years, from the time she
was two years old until her seventh birthday. Her therapist encouraged
her to confront her father, convincing Jill that her healing process could
not begin until her father acknowledged that he had abused her.
The confrontation served only to alienate her parents and siblings,
who responded to Jill's accusations with shocked disbelief. Jill's hus-
band claimed he did not know who she was any more, and Jill contem-
plated suicide on more than one occasion.
Convinced that her memories were true, but with no other cor-
roborating evidence, Jill brought a civil action against her father. She
was convinced that she could put her life back together only after her
father acknowledged what he had done to her and had taken responsi-
bility for his actions.
Jill alleges that the trauma of the sexual abuse caused her to com-
pletely repress memory of the abuse and that she was unable to connect
the abuse to any injury until her memory was restored through therapy.
Jill is now 30 years old. Additionally, Jill alleges that her father's acts
have caused her severe emotional distress and injury, including depres-
sion, anxiety, and suicidal tendencies. Jill's father has denied the
allegations.
I. INTRODUCTION
One can hardly pick up a magazine or newspaper or turn on the
television without reading or hearing about claims of repressed memo-
ries. A fifty-one year old man in Redwood City, California, was
recently convicted of a murder that occurred over twenty years ago.
The critical evidence against him was provided by his daughter who,
for over twenty years, had repressed the memory of witnessing the
murder.8 In 1991, Roseanne Barr Arnold announced that her mother
abused her from the time she was an infant until she was six or seven
years old and that her memories had suddenly returned after having
6. Id. at 81.
7. Id. at 137.
8. Michalene Busico, Nightmares About Daddy Won't Go Away, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 17,
1991, at D4.
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been repressed since her childhood. 9 Similarly, former Miss America
Marilyn Van Derbur publicly stated that her father had sexually abused
her and that she had repressed any knowledge of it until she was
twenty-four years old. 10
More recently, a thirty-four year old man claimed that Chicago's
Roman Catholic Cardinal Joseph Bernardin sexually abused him when
he was a seventeen year old seminary student and that he had repressed
the memory of the abuse for seventeen years. Paul McHugh, Direc-
tor of the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences at Johns
Hopkins Medical Institution in Baltimore, receives approximately one
telephone call per day from attorneys wanting to discuss a repressed-
memory case. McHugh believes this issue has grown to epidemic
proportions. 12
Civil litigation by adults claiming recovered memories has
increased sharply over recent years following changes in statutes of lim-
itation, parental immunity laws, redefinition of the term "negligence,"
and the differentiation between "intentional infliction of injury" and
"intentional act.' ' 3
The rise in reported sexual abuse cases has created an intense
desire for scientific verification as to how people recall past sexual
abuse.' 4 Meanwhile, the scientific community has split into opposing
camps hotly debating the validity of repressed memories. At this time,
it appears that the legal community cannot rely with any certainty upon
the validity of these types of claims absent agreement among the scien-
tific community.
This Comment explores whether testimony regarding repressed
memories is admissible under Washington rules of evidence. This
Comment concludes that the process of repression and accurate recall
of memories has not been proven to be a sufficiently reliable and trust-
worthy phenomenon to justify admission of evidence that abuse
occurred.
9. Roseanne Barr Arnold & Vickie Bane, A Star Cries Incest, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, Oct. 7,
1991, at 84-88.
10. Marilyn Van Derbur Ater & Vickie Bane, The Darkest Secret, PEOPLE MAGAZINE, June
10, 1991, at 88-94.
11. Patricia Edmonds, Cardinal Combating Abuse Now Target of Charges, USA TODAY, Nov.
15, 1993, at 3A.
12. Carol McHugh, Suits Claiming Childhood Sex Abuse on Rise; Lawyers, Experts Question
Recovered Memories, CHICAGO DAILY L. BULL., Sept. 22, 1993, at 1.
13. J.K. Colaneri & D. R. Johnson, Coverage for Parents' Sexual Abuse, FOR THE DEFENSE,
March, 1992, at 2-5.
14. Bruce Bower, Sudden Recall: Adult Memories of Child Abuse Spark a Heated Debate, Set.
NEWS, Sept. 18, 1993, at 184.
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Section II of this Comment sets forth the historical and legal back-
ground of civil lawsuits claiming repressed memories of childhood sex-
ual abuse in the State of Washington. Section III of this Comment
describes the debate within the scientific community over whether
memories can be completely repressed and accurately recalled. Section
IV of this Comment explores the proper standard for admitting scien-
tific evidence in the State of Washington. Section V of this Comment
sets forth the two-tier inquiry engaged in by Washington courts to
determine the admissibility of novel scientific evidence under Rule 702.
Section VI of this Comment analyzes cases involving previous attempts
by the Washington Supreme Court to determine the admissibility of
new scientific theories. Section VII of this Comment explores how the
Washington Supreme Court's previous Frye analyses may provide
assistance in determining the admissibility of repressed memory
evidence.
Finally, Section VIII of this Comment concludes that the scientific
basis of the process of repression and accurate recall is insufficiently
accepted in the scientific community to allow admission of the evi-
dence. Anticipating a future definitive ruling by the Washington
Supreme Court, this Comment frames the issue that the court should
address when it is called upon to settle the question of admissibility.
For purposes of this Comment, it will be assumed that Jill's claim
has survived any statute of limitations defense and is before the court,
with no corroboration for her claim that her memory of the abuse was
recalled in therapy other than her own testimony and that of her
therapist.
II. HISTORY OF REPRESSED MEMORY CLAIMS OF CHILDHOOD
SEXUAL ABUSE IN WASHINGTON
Until 1988, a plaintiff's claim for childhood sexual abuse was
greatly restricted and essentially barred by the statutes of limitations set
forth in RCW 4.16.0805 and 4.16.100.16 RCW 4.16.080(2) provided
that, in general, an action for personal injury must be brought within
three years of the time the cause of action accrued. 7 RCW 4.16.100(1)
provided that an action for assault and battery must be brought within
two years.1" If the person bringing the action was under the age of
eighteen years at the time the cause of action accrued, the statute of
15. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.080 (1992).
16. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.100 (1992).
17. Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 74, 727 P.2d 226, 227 (1986) (5-4 decision),
superseded by WASH REV. CODE § 4.16.190 (1988).
18. Id.
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limitations was tolled until the person reached eighteen years of age. 19
Under these rules, the limitations period expired, at the latest, three
years after the plaintiff's eighteenth birthday.20 In 1986, a plaintiff
challenged the trial court's finding that her claim was barred by the
above-mentioned statutes of limitations.
A. Tyson v. Tyson
Nancy Louise Tyson was twenty-six years old when she sought
damages from her father for multiple acts of sexual abuse that allegedly
occurred when she was between the ages of three and eleven. She
claimed that the sexual abuse had been blocked from her conscious
memory until recovered during psychological therapy less than one
year before she initiated the action.21 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington certified the following question
of state law to the Washington Supreme Court:
Does the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until
the plaintiff discovers or reasonably should have discovered a cause
of action, apply to intentional torts where the victim has blocked the
incident from her conscious memory during the entire time of the
statute of limitations?2
In urging the court to apply the discovery rule23 to her cause of
action, Ms. Tyson claimed that the alleged acts of sexual abuse had
caused her such emotional trauma that she had repressed her memory
of the events entirely.24 Only years after the statute of limitations had
expired did therapy trigger her knowledge of the abuse and her recog-
nition that the abuse had caused her the emotional problems she was
experiencing as an adult.25 She argued that it would be unfair to pre-
19. WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.190 (1988).
20. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75, 727 P.2d at 227.
21. Id. at 73, 727 P.2d at 227.
22. Id. at 73-74, 727 P.2d at 226-27.
23. The discovery rule provides that a statute of limitations will not begin to run until the
plaintiff using reasonable diligence would have discovered the cause of action. U.S. Oil & Ref.
Co. v. Department of Ecology, 96 Wash. 2d 85, 92, 633 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1981). The discovery
rule was first adopted in Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash. 2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969), in which the
Washington Supreme Court held that, where an injured party may not know or be expected to
know he has been injured, it would be unfair to automatically foreclose his cause of action because
the statute of limitations had run. Id. at 665, 453 P.2d at 634-35. The court adopted a
fundamental fairness test, balancing the "harm of being deprived of a remedy versus the harm of
being sued." Id.; Mark D. Kamitomo, Note, Discovery Rule Application in Child Abuse Actions, 23
GoNz. L. REv. 223, 226 (1988).
24. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d at 75, 727 P.2d at 227.
25. Id.
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clude her claim because she was unable to discover her cause of action
during the applicable limitations period.26
While recognizing that child sexual abuse has a devastating
impact on the victim, the court refused to apply the discovery rule after
seriously considering the potential effects on Washington's system of
justice. 27 The potential adverse effects noted by the court included:
(1) evidentiary problems arising from stale claims (including the trust-
worthiness of memory); (2) lack of empirical evidence of the occurrence
of the alleged act and resulting harm; (3) lack of subjective methods of
investigation and findings based upon physically observable evidence
(rather than potential distortion of the truth through the psychoanalytic
process); (4) great potential for spurious claims; (5) unreasonably low
probability of a court being able to determine the truth; and, (6) the
existence of a reasonable opportunity (three years beyond the age of
majority) for the plaintiff to have asserted a claim.28
In 1988, two years after the Tyson decision, the Washington State
Legislature applied the discovery rule to childhood sexual abuse cases
by enacting RCW 4.16.340,29 which expressly overruled the Supreme
Court's decision in Tyson.
B. RCW 4.16.340. Actions Based on Childhood Sexual Abuse
RCW 4.16.340 provides, in part, as follows:
(1) All claims or causes of action based on intentional conduct
brought by any person for recovery of damages for injury suffered as
a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced within the
later of the following periods:
(a) Within three years of the act alleged to have caused the
injury or condition;
(b) Within three years of the time the victim discovered or rea-
sonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was
caused by said act; or
(c) Within three years of the time the victim discovered that
the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought... 30
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 75-80, 727 P.2d at 227-30.
29. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340 (1988).
30. WASH. Rxv. CODE § 4.16.340 (1992). The statute was enacted by E.S.S.B. 6305 Sec. 1,
50th Leg., Reg. Sess., 1988 Wash. Laws 559, amended by S.B. 5950 Sec. 2, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess.,
1989 Wash. Laws. 1578, and further amended by E.S.H.B. 2058 Sec. 2, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess.,
1991 Wash. Laws 1084.
The remaining text of the statute provides as follows:
Provided, That the time limit for commencement of an action under this section is tolled
for a child until the child reaches the age of eighteen years.
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The statute, as originally enacted in 1988, provided for a cause of
action within either (1) three years of the act alleged or (2) three years
from the time of discovery. The 1989 amendment included the proviso
that any action is tolled until a child reaches the age of eighteen years.
Most importantly, however, the 1991 amendment added subdivision
(c), which provides that a cause of action may be brought upon discov-
ery "that the act caused the injury for which the claim is brought."3
The Legislature also supplied its reasons for applying the more
liberal application of the statute of limitations:
The victim of childhood sexual abuse may repress the memory of the
abuse or be unable to connect the abuse to any injury until after the
statute of limitations has run. The victim of childhood sexual abuse
may be unable to understand or make the connection between child-
hood sexual abuse and emotional harm or damage until many years
after the abuse occurs. Even though victims may be aware of injuries
related to the childhood sexual abuse, more serious injuries may be
discovered many years later. 32
Although a victim may have experienced some trauma, such as
stomachaches, the trauma may not have been severe enough to prompt
suit within three years of the victim's eighteenth birthday. Therefore,
(2) The victim need not establish which act in a series of continuing sexual abuse or
exploitation incidents caused the injury complained of, but may compute the date
of discovery from the date of discovery of the last act by the same perpetrator
which is part of a common scheme or plan of sexual abuse or exploitation.
(3) The knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian shall not be imputed to a person
under the age of eighteen years.
(4) For purposes of this section, "child" means a person under the age of eighteen
years.
(5) As used in this section, "childhood sexual abuse" means any act committed by the
defendant against a complainant who was less than eighteen years of age at the time
of the act and which act would have been a violation of chapter 9A.44 RCW or
RCW 9.68A.040 or prior laws of similar effect at the time the act was committed.
31. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.340(1)(c). In the bill proposing the 1991 amendment the
Legislature explained inclusion of this language:
It is still the legislature's intention that Tyson v. Tyson, 107 Wash. 2d 72, 727 P.2d 226
(1986) be reversed, as well as the line of cases that state that discovery of any injury
whatsoever caused by an act of childhood sexual abuse commences the statute of
limitations. The legislature intends that the earlier discovery of less serious injuries
should not affect the statute of limitations for injuries that are discovered later.
E.S.H.B. 2058 § 1, 52nd Leg., Reg. Sess., 1991 Wash. Laws 1085.
32. E.S.H.B. 2058, 1991 Wash. Laws 1084. A summary of the bill in the Washington
Legislative Report provides additional explanation:
In addition to the cases in which a victim may suffer injuries, but does not know that the
sexual abuse caused the injury due to suppressed memory of the sexual abuse, a victim
may remember the sexual abuse but may have a delayed reaction to the abuse. The
victim may experience significant suffering from the abuse later in life.
E.S.H.B. 2058, 1990-92 Wash. Leg. Rep. 149.
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when more severe injuries develop later in life, such as suicidal tenden-
cies or depression, the victim will not be foreclosed from suing for
those more severe injuries.33
While the question of when a plaintiff may bring an action for
alleged childhood sexual abuse has been answered by the legislature,
the question of whether the Washington rules of evidence will allow
repressed memories into evidence still remains to be answered.34 As
noted by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire after it affirmed appli-
cation of the discovery rule to the applicable statute of limitations for
childhood sexual abuse, the plaintiff still carries the burden of substan-
tiating allegations of abuse and, if challenged, validating the phenome-
non of memory repression and the admissibility of evidence in the form
of recalled memories.35
III. THE DEBATE WITHIN THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY
It appears that proponents and opponents of the theory of
repressed memories agree that childhood sexual abuse is a tragically
common occurrence, and they generally agree that the human mind is
capable of repressing certain memories. There appears to be no agree-
ment, however, on how the human mind actually represses memories,
or on whether the human mind is capable of repressing memories for
long periods of time and then accurately recalling them. The essential
debate within the scientific community is whether a distinction
between true and false memories can be made.
A. The Memories are Accurate
Many experts believe that victims of sexual abuse often develop
some degree of amnesia and that in cases of delayed recall, memories
generally prove accurate.3 6
Judith Lewis Herman, noted author and psychiatrist at Harvard
Medical School, regards the new emphasis on adult memories of early
sexual abuse as a "healthy antidote to decades of legal and psychiatric
neglect suffered by abused individuals. ' 37
33. See E.S.H.B. 2058, 1991 Wash. Laws 1084.
34. The legislature's detailed treatment of WASH. REv. CODE § 4.16.340 raises an
interesting question of whether the legislature examined and is impliedly endorsing the scientific
principle of repression and accurate recall of memories.
35. Jill McCollum v. George and Elizabeth D'Arcy, 638 A.2d 797, 799 (1994).
36. Bower, supra note 14, at 185 (quoting Judith Lewis Herman, psychiatrist at Harvard
Medical School in Boston and author of TRAuMA AND RECOVERY (1992)).
37. Id. at 184.
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"Self-help" books based upon the premise that memories of child-
hood sexual abuse are real offer check lists to help readers identify
whether they were victims of childhood abuse.3" Signs of past abuse
may include feeling bad or ashamed, feeling powerless, having low self-
esteem, lacking motivation, suffering from phobias, experiencing
problems with sex and relationships, developing arthritis, and desiring
31to change one's name.
Lucy Berliner, a social worker at Harborview Sexual Assault
Center in Seattle, notes that symptom checklists cannot establish that
someone was sexually abused. However, she is not persuaded that
therapists "commonly diagnose sexual abuse with check lists or engage
in a wholesale tendency to talk people into recalling childhood
abuse."4"
Similarly, Ms. Herman believes that therapists rarely wield
enough power over patients to impose false memories on them. She
acknowledges that when hypnosis is used to explore childhood memo-
ries, there may be a heightened tendency to create memories in order to
please a therapist. Ms. Herman states, however, that of the more than
two hundred cases seen in her trauma program in the past year, only
one person based a claim of sexual abuse solely on memories recovered
while under hypnosis.41
In two recent articles, Bruce Bower noted that many researchers
assert that psychological problems rise significantly in conjunction with
the frequency of childhood sexual abuse.4 2 These problems may
include borderline personality disorders, multiple personality disorders,
substance abuse, eating disorders, and somatoform disorders (such as
pseudoseizures, pelvic pain, and gastrointestinal disturbances with no
known physical cause).43 Some investigators also argue that severe,
repeated sexual assaults often produce Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD), a cluster of symptoms including persistent sadness, feelings of
unreality, social isolation, and either amnesia for or constant reliving of
traumatic events.44 However, Bower also notes that there is no consen-
sus regarding how childhood sexual abuse might induce bulimia in one
38. BASS & DAVIS, supra note 3; Blume, supra note 1.
39. See, e.g., supra note 1.
40. Bruce Bower, The Survivor Syndrome: Childhood Sexual Abuse Leaves a Controversial
Trail of Aftereffects, Sci. NEws, Sept. 25, 1993, at 202 (quoting Lucy Berliner).
41. Bower, supra note 14, at 185.
42. See Bower, supra note 40, at 202.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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person, multiple personalities in another, and cocaine addiction in a
third.45
A helpful explanation of why some therapists believe post trau-
matic stress disorder may be produced by childhood sexual abuse was
reviewed by a United States District Court in Nicolette v. Carey.46
There, the court reviewed the affidavit of a certified social worker sub-
mitted in support of plaintiff's response to a summary judgment
motion asserting that her claim was time barred.
By way of explaining the plaintiff's inability to previously recall
the sexual abuse, the social worker stated that the plaintiff had
repressed and disassociated most of the abuse committed by her father:
Repression occurs when a person puts into their [sic] unconscious
mind any memory that is too painful to think about.... During the
time the incidents of sexual abuse were repressed, they were not in
plaintiff's consciousness, and therefore plaintiff was unaware of most
of the sexual acts that had been committed upon her.
Disassociation is an extension of repression . . . disassociation
occurs when an event is so traumatic that, although a person is phys-
ically there at the time the event occurs, they enter into an altered
state of consciousness in an effort to avoid the event. The trauma
itself is experienced in an altered state of consciousness. When an
event has been disassociated, a person represses it not because they
do not want to remember it, but because they cannot remember it.
They are unable to bring it to their conscious mind at will.
One level of disassociation is called PTSD (Post Traumatic
Stress Disorder). At this level, the time period itself is not disassoci-
ated-only the memories of the specific events. A person at this
level blocks the traumatic event itself, but not the period of time in
which it occurred. This level of disassociation is reached by a series
of chronic events. Normally, severe, recurring and sustained trauma
brings about this level.47
Lenore C. Terr, a psychiatrist at the University of California, San
Francisco, has evaluated or treated more than 150 children exposed to a
variety of extreme traumas. Terr believes that children who experience
repeated and brutal sexual abuse may forget large portions of their
childhood, not just specific assaults.4" Although memories of such
abuse may be fabricated through the suggestions or persuasion of
others, Terr states that children who have genuinely blocked out pro-
45. Id.
46. 751 F. Supp. 695 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
47. Id. at 697-99.
48. Lenore C. Terr, Childhood Traumas: An Outline and Ovemiew, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
10, 16 (1991).
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longed abuse display telltale signs and symptoms including an indiffer-
ence to pain, a lack of empathy, an inability to define or acknowledge
feelings, and an abhorrence of emotional intimacy.49 Moreover, as
these children grow up, they tend to both fear and to symbolically
reenact, through behaviors or physical symptoms, the specific sexual
acts they were forced to perform."0
This pattern, Herman notes, may be broken and spur delayed
recall of sexual abuse when there are changes in intimate relationships,
such as becoming sexually involved or giving birth to a child."1
Although ample scientific authority supports the view that recall
of repressed memories is scientifically reliable, there is also ample
authority to the contrary.
B. The Memories Are False
While our awareness of childhood sexual abuse has increased enor-
mously in the last decade and the horrors of its consequences should
never be minimized, there is another side to this debate. Many
scientists believe that therapists may, albeit with the best intentions,
contribute to false allegations and subsequent family suffering. 2
Recovered-memory therapy may often result in shattered family units,
destroyed reputations, divorce, and custody battles.5 3
Because claims of recovered memories are often presented with lit-
tle or no corroborating evidence, juries are left to weigh the credibility
of the victim and of the accused, and are asked to rely exclusively on
revelations from psychotherapy. However, "because psychotherapy is
a healing technique and not a search for truth, it may not be a reliable
source of facts. ' 5 4
In a recent article addressing recovered memories of alleged sexual
abuse, Hollida Wakefield, M.A., and Ralph Underwager, Ph.D., con-
cluded that claims of repressed memories recovered in the course of
therapy are not likely to be supported by empirical data."s After
reviewing popular and scientific literature in the field, Wakefield and
Underwager stated that the area "seems dominated by believing ther-
apists who simply repeat clinical anecdotes, state subjective specula-
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Bower, supra note 14, at 185.
52. False Memory Syndrome Foundation Flyer (quoting Harold Lief, M.D.) (on file with
Seattle University Law Review).
53. Elizabeth F. Loftus & Laura A. Rosenwald, Buried Memories Shattered Lives, 79 A.B.A.
J., Nov. 1993, at 71.
54. Id.
55. Wakefield & Underwager, supra note 2, at 487.
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tion, and make unsupported assertions about repressed abuse. "56
Studies reviewed by Wakefield and Underwager led them to conclude
that the actual purpose of therapy is to uncover memories of sexual
abuse and to help the patient become convinced of the historical reality
of the abuse, even if the abuse cannot be verified and the patient
doubts that the memory is real."7 Additionally, Wakefield and
Underwager concluded that claims of recovered repressed memories are
based upon assumptions, speculations, inferred internal states, and
mental processes for which there is, at best, very limited credible sup-
port- "[t]o believe in the reality of these memories often requires
suspension of critical reasoning and a leap of blind faith.""8
Elizabeth F. Loftus, professor of psychology, adjunct professor of
law at the University of Washington, and co-author of Witness for the
Defense, 9 suggests the existence of two important sources "that could
potentially feed into the construction of false memories. ' 60 These are
popular writings and therapists' suggestions.61 Popular writings, or
self-help books, such as The Courage to Heal62 and Secret Survivors,63
suggest to readers that even if there are no memories of abuse, they
were likely abused, and that repression of those memories is undoubt-
edly causing their troubles. These books provide check lists and exer-
cises to help the reader remember incidents of abuse. While noting
that the suggestions outlined in self-help books might lift the lid off a
repressed memory, Professor Loftus believes another equally viable
hypothesis exists. That is that the suggestions outlined may actually
influence the creation of memories or, at the very least, may ultimately
direct the reader to a search through memory.64
Professor Loftus maintains that some therapists enthusiastically
engage in persistent and intrusive probing to uncover early traumatic
memories:
Whatever the good intentions of therapists, the documented exam-
ples of rampant suggestion should force us to at least ponder whether
the therapists might be suggesting illusory memories to their clients
rather than unlocking distant memories that are authentic. Or....
56. Id.
57. Id. at 484.
58. Id. at 503.
59. ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & KATHERINE KETCHAM, WITNESS FOR THE DEFENSE (1991).
60. ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, THE REALITY OF REPRESSED MEMORIES 18 (expanded version
of address to the Psi Chi/Frederick Howell Lewis Distinguished Lecture, presented at the
centennial meeting of the American Psychological Association, Washington D.C., August, 1992).
61. Id.
62. BASS & DAvIS, supra note 3.
63. BLUME, supra note 1.
64. LoFrus, supra note 60, at 19.
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what is considered to be present in the client's unconscious mind,
might actually be present solely in the therapist's conscious mind.65
Intrusive techniques employed by some therapists may include
direct questioning, hypnosis, reading books, attending survivor's
groups, age regression, and dream analysis. 66 For example, in Lund-
berg-Love's treatment program at the University of Texas, the first
goal of treatment is to retrieve memories. After memories are retrieved
and a woman can talk about the abuse, she is encouraged to express her
rage by writing angry letters to her abuser and by throwing darts at his
picture.67
In support of their claims that therapists may inadvertently plant
false memories through suggestive questioning and/or drug therapy,
opponents of the theory of repressed memories can now point to an
increasing number of cases where patients are bringing medical mal-
practice actions against their therapists. In a landmark case, a Califor-
nia court recently allowed an accused father to bring suit against his
daughter's therapists for implanting false memories of sexual abuse.68
The jury found that the daughter's therapists had negligently planted
the false memories and awarded the father $500,000 for lost wages and
future losses.69
Richard Ofshe, Professor of Sociology at the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley, is unequivocal in his assertion that there is no evidence
to support the theory of recovered memories:
Sixty years of experiments that would demonstrate the phenomenon
[of recovered memories] have failed to produce any evidence of its
existence. The notion of repression has never been more than an
unsubstantiated speculation tied to other Freudian concepts and
speculative mechanisms. The only support repression has ever had
is anecdotal and contributed by psychoanalysts who presume the
existence of a repression mechanism.70
65. LoFrus, supra note 60, at 20, 28.
66. Wakefield & Underwager, supra note 2, at 484.
67. Id.
68. Ramona v. Ramona, No. 61898 (Napa County Super. Ct., July 11, 1994); Maria L. La
Ganga, Implanted-Memory Verdict Could Change Therapists' Role, THE NEws TRiB. (TAcoMA),
May 15, 1994, at A12.
69. Ramona, No. 61898 (Napa County Super. Ct., July 11, 1994); see also Loftus &
Rosenwald, supra note 53. Loftus and Rosenwald review the increase in negligence actions against
therapists and increased skepticism of sex abuse claims based on recovered memories. Therapists
may employ techniques such as age regression, bioenergetics, psychodrama, trance work,
visualization, and guided imaging. Id. at 73.
70. Loftus & Rosenwald, supra note 53, at 71 (emphasis added).
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The continuing debate within the scientific community illustrates
that complete repression and accurate recall of repressed memories is
neither fully understood nor accepted. Those claiming that the memo-
ries are accurate point to clinical studies where people in therapy recall
memories of previous sexual abuse. Those claiming that the memories
are not accurate reject the clinical studies as unconfirmed speculations
and note that over sixty years of research has failed to uncover any.
controlled laboratory experiment to support the theory of repression.
Because the theory of repressed memories is not sufficiently accepted in
the scientific community, the admissibility of repressed memory evi-
dence in Washington is highly questionable.
IV. THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF ADMISSIBILITY: FRYE OR
DAUBERT?
Before an analysis of the admissibility of repressed memory evi-
dence can be undertaken, it should be noted that the proper standard
for admitting expert scientific testimony in the State of Washington
may be in question.
A. The Frye Analysis
Washington courts have long adhered to the standard announced
over seventy years ago in Frye v. United States.71 In Frye, the court
ruled that novel evidence derived from a scientific theory or principle is
admissible only if that theory or principle has achieved general accept-
ance in the relevant scientific community. 72 The Frye court held that
lie detector results were inadmissible, stating:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between
the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle
must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting
expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular
field in which it belongs.73
In Washington, this standard has frequently been applied to determine
the admissibility of scientific evidence.74
71. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
72. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. See generally State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (battered woman
syndrome evidence admissible); State v. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984)
(hypnosis evidence inadmissible); State v. Woo, 84 Wash. 2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974) (polygraph
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In applying the test, it is not a court's purpose to second-guess the
scientific community. Rather, the inquiry turns on the level of recogni-
tion accorded to the scientific principle involved; the court must look
for general acceptance in the appropriate scientific community.7" A
trial court's decision to admit novel scientific evidence will be reviewed
de novo.76
Both before and after the adoption of Washington's Rules of Evi-
dence, courts have required trustworthiness and reliability in the fac-
tual, informational, or scientific basis of an expert opinion (including
the principles or procedures through which the expert's conclusions are
reached).77 The elements of trustworthiness and reliability remove the
dangers of speculation and conjecture and give at least minimal assur-
ance that the opinion can assist the trier of fact.78 Courts have looked
to literature on the particular subject and opinions of other jurisdictions
for guidance.' 9
B. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Despite the Frye test's wide acceptance, the United States Supreme
Court recently rejected the Frye standard in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,80 holding that the proper standard for admitting
expert scientific testimony in a federal trial is contained in the Federal
evidence inadmissible in the absence of stipulation by both parties); State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d
336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987) (rape trauma syndrome evidence inadmissible); Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at
220, 850 P.2d at 495 (1993) (battered child syndrome evidence admissible); Cauthron, 120 Wash.
2d at 879, 846 P.2d at 502 (1993) (evidence utilizing restricted fragment length polymorphism
method of DNA typing admissible).
75. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 887, 846 P.2d at 505.
76. Id.
77. State v. Maule, 35 Wash. App. 287, 294, 667 P.2d 96, 99 (1983).
78. Id.
79. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 342, 745 P.2d at 16 (discussing the scientific literature pertaining
to rape trauma syndrome); Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at 721-22, 684 P.2d at 655 (examining the
literature on hypnosis).
80. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), on remand, No. 90-55397, 1995 WL 1736 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 1995).
Daubert was a civil case where two minor children and their parents alleged that the childrens'
serious birth defects had been caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Benedectin, a
prescription drug marketed by the respondent. The scientific evidence in question was that
offered by the plaintiffs' experts on the issue of causation, and included opinions based on animal
studies and chemical analyses (not employing epidemiological methodology), and recalculations of
previously published epidemiological data. Id. at 2791-92. Based on the Frye standard, the
District Court and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals each noted that the only generally accepted
methodology concerning the effect of Benedectin on pregnancy was epidemiological testing.
Therefore, the plaintiffs' non-epidemiological methodology (animal studies and chemical
analyses) was not generally accepted nor shown to be a reliable technique. Id. at 2792.
Additionally, the recalculations of epidemiological data were rejected because the expert's
reanalysis had not been subjected to verification and scrutiny by others in the scientific field. Id.
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Rules of Evidence.81 The Court noted that the rules place appropriate
limits on the admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by
assigning to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testi-
mony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at
hand. 2
Following the decision in Daubert, the Washington Supreme
Court, without comment on the Daubert case, applied the Frye standard
in Personal Restraint of Young. s3 More recently, in March of 1994, the
Washington Supreme Court recognized the U.S. Supreme Court's
rejection of the Frye standard, but stated its intention to adhere to it:84
We recognize that the United States Supreme Court has recently
held that the Frye standard is not applicable under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Nevertheless, in this state, we continue to adhere to the
view that the Frye analysis is a threshold inquiry to be considered in
determining the admissibility of evidence under ER 702.85
The court did find, however, that many of the "general observa-
tions" made by Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion of Daubert
may be of use to trial judges in making the threshold Frye determina-
tion.s6 Additionally, the court specifically cited to Daubert for the
proposition that "scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily
scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes. "87 Moreover, the court
stated that even if it were to adopt the Daubert analysis, the testimony
at issue in the case before it would be inadmissible.8 8
The question of whether the State of Washington should continue
to adhere to the Frye standard or adopt the Daubert standard is a ques-
tion that only the Supreme Court of Washington can resolve. 9
81. Id. at 2792-99.
82. Id.
83. 122 Wash. 2d 1, 55-56, 857 P.2d 989, 1016 (1993).
84. State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 360 n.1, 869 P.2d 43, 48 n.1. (1994).
85. Id. (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 360, 869 P.2d at 48 (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796).
88. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 360 n.l., 869 P.2d at 48 n.1.
89. Daubert is, of course, not binding on Washington courts, and the Frye rule will continue
to apply in Washington until the state supreme court says otherwise. Nevertheless, Daubert is
bound to generate a heated debate about whether F-ye should continue to be followed in
Washington, and an eventual challenge to Frye at the state level seems inevitable. SC K.
TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON EVIDENCE
243 (1994).
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C. Division I's Refusal To Follow the Washington Supreme Court's
Lead: Reese v. Stroh
Despite the Washington Supreme Court's stance on the applica-
tion of the Daubert analysis, in the recent Washington Court of
Appeals decision, Reese v. Stroh, Division I rejected the Frye standard
and adopted the approach taken in Daubert.90 In Reese, the plaintiffs
brought their medical malpractice action against a physician for failing
to treat Mr. Reese's emphysema condition with a protein replacement
therapy called Prolastin.91
The plaintiff's expert was expected to testify as to the Food and
Drug Administration's approval of Prolastin, the preliminary salutary
results from its use, and his own clinical experience in treating patients
with Prolastin.92 After hearing plaintiff's offer of proof, the trial court
ruled that the expert's testimony lacked the necessary scientific founda-
tion and was, therefore, inadmissible.9" Before deciding whether there
was an adequate foundation for the expert's opinion, Division I held
that the Frye standard does not apply to expert testimony in civil
cases. 94
Division I based its rejection of the Frye standard, in part, on its
conclusion that (1) with one exception, the courts of Washington have
neither discussed nor applied Frye in the context of a civil case; (2) in
the one civil case applying the Frye standard, the court did not discuss
why it was importing the Frye standard into the civil arena; and (3) the
Washington Supreme Court has never adopted the Frye standard in
civil cases, and has intimated that a Frye analysis is appropriate only in
criminal and quasi-criminal cases.9" Division I's rationale for rejecting
the Frye standard is flawed. Each of Division I's stated rationale for
rejecting the Frye standard is examined below.
1. Contrary to Division I's assertion, the courts of Washington
have discussed and applied the Frye standard in more than
one civil case
The one exception referred to by Division I in Reese is the case of
Burkett v. Northern.96 In Burkett, an action to recover damages result-
90. 74 Wash. App. 550, 874 P.2d 200, review granted, 124 Wash. 2d 1018, 881 P.2d 253
(1994).
91. Id. at 552, 874 P.2d at 201-02.
92. Id. at 553-55, 874 P.2d at 202-03.
93. Id. at 555, 874 P.2d at 203.
94. Id. at 555-56, 874 P.2d at 203-04.
95. Id. at 556-57, 874 P.2d at 204.
96. 43 Wash App. 143, 715 P.2d 1159, review denied, 106 Wash. 2d 1008 (1986).
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ing from an automobile accident, Division III applied the Frye standard
and excluded expert medical testimony regarding thermography.97
In addition to the Burkett decision, the Washington Supreme
Court has more recently applied the Frye standard in an attorney disci-
plinary proceeding.9" Although Division I acknowledged the Peterson
decision, it stated that the Washington Supreme Court had only sug-
gested a "Frye-type" rule and did not cite to Frye nor discuss its appli-
cation in the civil context.99
However, the Peterson court specifically stated that experts must
meet the requirements of Rule of Evidence 702, including (1) that the
witness qualify as an expert, (2) that the opinion be based on an explana-
tory theory generally accepted in the scientific community; and (3) that the
testimony be helpful to the trier of fact.1 °0
In addition to quoting the Frye standard almost verbatim, the
Peterson court footnoted its statement with a citation to State v. Cis-
kie."'0 The Ciskie court examined the acceptance of the battered
woman syndrome in the scientific community.10 2 In concluding that
the battered woman syndrome was reliable, the court relied on several
cases where the Washington Supreme Court had analyzed the general
acceptance of the syndrome in the scientific community.'0 3
In another civil case, Division I recently reviewed the admissibility
of expert evidence that was attacked on the basis that the experts' the-
ory of causation was too novel.'0 4 In Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Depart-
ment of Labor and Industries,05 worker's compensation benefits for
occupational disease had been awarded to three workers who claimed
they became disabled as a result of long term exposure to toxic subton-
ics at the plaintiff's plant.10 6 Intalco attacked the workers' medical evi-
dence because no other studies of neurologic disease and aluminum
plant workers existed to substantiate the medical experts' theory that
aluminum was the causative agent involved in the claimants' disease.10 7
97. Id. at 144-47, 715 P.2d at 1160-61. A recent development in the medical field at the
time of the court's decision in Burkett, thermography is a technique of recording in photographic
form heat energy emission patterns radiating from the human body. Id. at 144, 715 P.2d at 1160.
98. In re Peterson, 120 Wash. 2d 833, 869, 846 P.2d 1330, 1353 (1993).
99. 74 Wash. App. at 557 n.5, 874 P.2d at 204 n.5.
100. Peterson, 120 Wash. 2d at 869, 846 P.2d at 1353 (emphasis added).
101. 110 Wash. 2d 263, 751 P.2d 1165 (1988).
102. Id. at 271, 751 P.2d at 1170.
103. Id. at 271, 751 P.2d at 1169 (citing State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312
(1984); State v. Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188, 685 P.2d 564 (1984)).
104. Intalco Aluminum Corp. v. Department of Labor and Indus., 66 Wash. App. 644, 833
P.2d.390 (1992), review denied, 120 Wash. 2d 1031 (1993).
105. Id. at 648, 833 P.2d at 392.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 659, 833 P.2d at 398.
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Although Intalco conceded that the methods used by the experts
were methods of clinical examination and laboratory testing "generally
accepted in the scientific community", the workers viewed Intalco's
argument as a challenge to admissibility of the medical testimony based
on lack of foundation under ER 702 and 703. Because Intalco recog-
nized that the foundation for the evidence was proper, the court did not
address the workers' argument on that ground.1 08
In addressing the causation issue, however, Division I confirmed
the validity of the Frye standard, noting that the requirement that med-
ical expert testimony be based on methods "generally accepted in the
scientific community" pertains to methods used by scientists and not
the conclusions they reach.109 Thus, an expert physician's opinion on
causation need not be generally accepted in the scientific community; it
is the methods upon which the expert relies in forming his or her opin-
ion that must be generally accepted. 0
2. Contrary to Division I's assertion, the Washington Supreme
Court has adequately supported its application of the Frye
standard in civil cases
In Burkett, the "one exception" referred to by Division I, it was
specifically noted that the Washington Supreme Court had adopted the
Frye standard." 1 The Burkett court stated that the appropriate test was
whether the scientific principles from which the deductions are made
are sufficiently established to have general acceptance in the relevant
scientific community as being reliable and accurate. 11 2 In addition to
several Washington Supreme Court decisions applying the Frye stan-
dard in criminal cases, the Burkett court also cited to ER 702 for the
proposition that the Frye standard was the appropriate standard:
ER 702 follows this standard by permitting the trial court, in deter-
mining the admissibility of an expert opinion offered, in a novel
field, to assess the reliability of the theory, methodology, procedure
or principle propounded by the expert and the probative value of his
testimony. 1 13
108. Id. at 659 n.8, 833 P.2d at 399 n.8.
109. Id. at 622.
110. Id. at 662, 833 P.2d at 399 (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984); WASH. R. EVID. 703; see also Osborn v. Anchor Lab.,
Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 914-15 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1009 (1988).
111. Burkett, 43 Wash. App. at 144, 715 P.2d at 1160.
112. Id. at 144-45, 715 P.2d at 1160.
113. Id. at 145, 715 P.2d at 1160.
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3. Contrary to Division I's assertion, the Washington Supreme
Court has never drawn a distinction between criminal and
civil cases in determining the admissibility ofnovel scientific evidence
In support of its assertion that the Washington Supreme Court has
drawn a distinction between criminal and civil cases, Division I relies
upon the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the Frye standard in State v.
Canaday.114 In Canaday, the Washington Supreme Court noted that
the Frye standard had been implicitly adopted by it in State v. Woo." 5
Recognizing that at least nine other states had also adopted the Frye
standard, the court stated: "It [the Frye standard] is therefore the pre-
vailing rule and no court to our knowledge has rejected it with regard to
the admissibility of testimony based on scientific procedures at a crimi-
nal trial."1 16
As noted by Division I, the foregoing statement was an affirma-
tion by the Washington Supreme Court that the Frye standard was the
appropriate standard to be applied in criminal matters. However, there
is nothing in the Canaday opinion to support Division I's assertion that
the Washington Supreme Court was "intimating" that the Frye stan-
dard was appropriate only in criminal cases.
Division I also notes that the Frye standard was not applied in In
Re Johnston, a prison disciplinary proceeding.117 In Johnston, prison
inmates brought personal restraint petitions arising out of discipline
imposed on them for marijuana use." The issue before the court was
whether a positive result of a urinalysis test, conducted to detect the
presence of marijuana, constituted sufficient evidence of marijuana use
to uphold a prison disciplinary decision that revoked a prisoner's good
time credits or imposed mandatory segregation time. " 9
The prison inmates' statutory permission to earn good time credits
is a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 12' As such, inmates may
not be deprived of good time credits without minimum due process. 21
However, the inmates' liberty interest "must be accommodated in the
distinctive setting of a prison, where disciplinary proceedings 'take
place in a closed, tightly controlled environment peopled by those who
114. 90 Wash. 2d 808, 813, 585 P.2d 1185, 1188 (1978).
115. 84 Wash. 2d 472, 527 P.2d 271 (1974).
116. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d at 813, 585 P.2d at 1188.
117. Reese, 74 Wash. App. at 556-57, 874 P.2d at 204, (citing In Re Johnston, 109 Wash. 2d
493, 498, 745 P.2d 864, 867 (1987)).
118. Id. at 493, 745 P.2d at 864.
119. Id. at 494, 745 P.2d at 865.
120. Id. at 497.
121. Id. at 497, 745 P.2d at 866 (citing Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453 (1985)).
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have chosen to violate the criminal law and who have been lawfully
incarcerated for doing so.' "122 The evidentiary requirements of due
process are satisfied if there is "some evidence" in the record to support
a prison disciplinary decision revoking good time credits.123  As
emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in Hill:
Ascertaining whether this standard is satisfied does not require
examination of the entire record, independent assessment of the
credibility of witnesses, or weighing of the evidence. Instead, the
relevant question is whether there is any evidence in the record that
could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board. We
decline to adopt a more stringent evidentiary standard as a constitu-
tional requirement. 124
While recognizing that expert opinion on the reliability of the
urinalysis tests was not unanimous, the Washington Supreme Court
found any discrepancies immaterial "in light of the lesser evidentiary
standards applicable in prison disciplinary hearings. "112
Rather than an intimation that the Frye standard was only appro-
priate in criminal or quasi-criminal cases, the Johnston court was simply
recognizing that the evidentiary standard in a prison disciplinary deci-
sion differs from that in a criminal trial.126
The Washington Supreme Court has unequivocally stated its
intention to adhere to the Frye standard.1 27 At no time has the Court
stated that any distinction should be drawn between civil and criminal
cases in determining the admissibility of evidence. Significantly,
Daubert was a civil case. If the Washington Supreme Court had
desired to draw a distinction between criminal and civil cases, its deci-
sion in Riker (a criminal case) afforded it an excellent opportunity to do
so. Instead, the Court announced its continued adherence to the Frye
standard as a threshold inquiry in determining the admissibility of evi-
dence under ER 702.128
122. Id. (quoting Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.).
123. Hill, 474 U.S. at 455-56.
124. Id.
125. Johnston, 109 Wash. 2d at 500, 745 P.2d at 868.
126. Id.
127. State v. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d 351, 360 n.1, 869 P.2d 43, 48 n.1 (1994).
128. The Daubert decision does raise an interesting question of whether the rule enunciated
therein will apply in diversity cases. See Alan K. Steinbrecher & John A. Makarewich, Will the
Rule of 'Daubert'Apply in Diversity Cases?, WASH. J., June 13, 1994, at 6 (noting that the question
is whether state laws on the admission of expert scientific testimony involve substantive rights,
and providing a survey of those states within the Ninth Circuit that continue to adhere to the Frye
standard).
19941
Seattle University Law Review
D. The Daubert Criteria Have Not Altered the Analysis of the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
Although the Washington Supreme Court found that the "general
observations" made by Justice Blackmun in the majority opinion of
Daubert may be used by trial judges in making the threshold Frye
determination, 129 the Daubert criteria have done little or nothing to
alter the analysis of the admissibility of scientific evidence.
According to Daubert, the criteria a trial court should consider in
assessing whether scientific evidence is valid and will assist the trier of
fact include:
(1) whether the theory or technique can be or has been tested;
(2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication (although not dispositive, "submission to the
scrutiny of the scientific community is a component of good science");
(3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error and whether
there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and
(4) whether the theory or technique is "generally accepted" in the
scientific community (a known technique that has been able to attract
only minimal support within the community may properly be viewed
with skepticism).1 3
Additionally, the focus of the court's assessment is to be on princi-
ples of methodology, and not on the expert's conclusions.1 31
Similarly, the core concern of Frye is whether the evidence being
offered is based on established scientific methodology. This involves
both an accepted theory and a valid technique to implement that the-
ory. 132 In examining the Frye question, a Washington trial court must
consider the following criteria:
(1) whether the underlying theory is generally accepted in the sci-
entific community; and
(2) whether there are techniques, experiments, or studies utilizing
that theory which are capable of producing reliable results and are gen-
erally accepted in the scientific community. 1 3 3
The first criterion mandated by Frye is identical to the fourth cri-
terion announced in Daubert. And, the second criterion mandated by
Frye contains the remaining three criteria announced in Daubert. The
129. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 360 n.1, 869 P.2d at 48 n.1.
130. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
131. Id.
132. Riker, 123 Wash.2d at 359-60, 869 P.2d at 48 (citing Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 889,
846 P.2d at 507).
133. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 359, 869 P.2d at 47-48 (citing Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d. at 888-
89, 846 P.2d at 506-07).
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"techniques, experiments or studies utilizing a scientific theory which
are capable of producing reliable results," are arguably no more than a
method to determine whether a theory (1) has or can be tested; (2) has
been subjected to peer review and publication; and (3) has a known or
potential rate of error.
Citing Daubert once again, the Washington Supreme Court noted
that "scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the princi-
ple support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does applica-
tion of the principle produce consistent results?)." '134 Similarly, the
gatekeeping function of Frye requires both an accepted theory and a
reliable method of applying that theory to the facts of the case. 135
As illustrated by the cases analyzed later in this Comment, the
Washington Supreme Court has always based its determination of
whether scientific evidence is admissible upon a review of available sci-
entific literature, studies, publication, peer review, other literature, and
cases involving the scientific evidence or related theories of the scien-
tific evidence being considered. The Daubert analysis contributes little
to this established examination.1 36
V. ADMISSIBILITY UNDER WASHINGTON RULE OF EVIDENCE 703
Washington courts engage in a two-tier inquiry to determine the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence. First, the proposed testi-
mony must satisfy the Frye'3 7 standard for admissibility of novel
134. Riker, 123 Wash. 2d at 363, 869 P.2d at 50 (quoting Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795 n.9).
135. Id. at 363, 869 P.2d at 50.
136. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Daubert on remand illustrates the difficulty in applying
the Supreme Court's newly proclaimed two-pronged analysis in determining the admissibility of
scientific evidence under Rule 702. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), on remand, No. 90-55397,
1995 WL 1736 (9th Cir. January 4, 1995). In deciding the admissibility of expert testimony on
the effect of bendectin on the plaintiffs' injuries, the Ninth Circuit noted how the Supreme
Court's new analysis placed federal judges in an uncomfortable position. Id. at 3. The Ninth
Circuit noted that it was largely untrained in science and certainly no match for any of the expert
witnesses whose testimony it was reviewing. Id. Yet, it found itself in the position of having to
determine whether that expert's proposed testimony amounted to scientific knowledge,
constituted good science, and was derived by scientific method. Id. The court went on to state
that when the dispute concerns matters at the very cutting edge of scientific research, where fact
meets theory and certainty dissolves into probability, the task before it becomes even more
daunting. Id. at 4. As it reads the Supreme Court's opinion, the Ninth Circuit believes its task
now is to resolve disputes among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely
within their expertise. Mindful of its position in the hierarchy of the federal judiciary, the Ninth
Circuit took a "deep breath," proceeded with this "heady task," and affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment. Id. at 9.
The plaintiffs' claim failed primarily on the second requirement of Rule 702 as announced by
the Supreme Court in Daubert, i.e. the importance of a "fit" between the testimony and an issue in
the case (a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility).
Id. at 7 (citing Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796). In other words, causation.
137. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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scientific evidence. Second, the expert testimony must be properly
admissible under ER 702.138 The admissibility of expert testimony is
determined under ER 702 as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experi-
ence, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.' 39
Determining whether expert testimony is admissible is within a
trial court's discretion. 140 The two-part test to be applied under ER
702 is whether: (1) the witness qualifies as an expert and (2) the expert
testimony would be helpful to the trier of fact. 141
A. Qualifications of Expert
No expert opinion is admissible unless the witness has first been
qualified by a showing that he or she has sufficient expertise to state a
helpful and meaningful opinion. 41 While a witness need not possess
the academic credentials of an expert, the court may require specialized
knowledge in a case if the nature of the claims or defenses are com-
plex. 1 43 For example, in a prosecution for statutory rape, the trial court
properly refused to allow a defense psychologist to testify as to a three
year old's lack of memory and to the fact that a child's responses may
be shaped by the adult interviewer. The testimony was properly
refused in part because the psychologist lacked the necessary medical
training. 144
138. State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 232, 850 P.2d 495, 501 (1993); State v. Cauthron, 120
Wash. 2d 879, 885, 846 P.2d 502, 504 (1993). Once the Washington Supreme Court has made a
determination that the Frye test has been met as to a specific novel scientific theory or principle,
trial courts can generally rely upon that determination for admissibility of that theory in future
cases. However, trial courts must still undertake the Frye analysis if one party produces new
evidence that seriously questions the continued general acceptance or lack of acceptance as to that
theory within the relevant scientific community. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 888 n.3, 846 P.2d at
506 n.3.
139. WASH. R. EVID. 702.
140. Cauthron, 120 Wash. 2d at 890, 846 P.2d at 507.
141. Id.
142. Sehlin v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 38 Wash. App. 125,
133, 686 P.2d 492, 498, review denied, 102 Wash. 2d 1022 (1984).
143. 5 K. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, COURTROOM HANDBOOK ON
WASHINGTON EVIDENCE 204-05 (1992-93) [hereinafter TEGLAND].
144. Id.
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B. Expert Testimony is Helpful to the Trier of Fact
Under ER 702, expert testimony, opinion or otherwise, is allowed
when such testimony will "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue.""' s The court may properly
consider whether the testimony is relevant to an issue in the case and
whether the subject matter is beyond common understanding. 14 6 If no
special skill, experience, knowledge, or education is required, and the
matter may be judged by people of ordinary experience or knowledge,
admitting the expert testimony may invade the jury's role in judging
the credibility of witnesses.147 For example, in a prosecution for statu-
tory rape, a caseworker was allowed to testify that based upon her own
experience and training, common behavioral symptoms generally exist
in sexually abused children. However, she was not allowed to testify
that the children in the case at bar fit the profile.14
The Washington Supreme Court's application of the Frye analysis
and ER 702 to the theories of battered wife syndrome, battered child
syndrome, rape trauma syndrome, and hypnotically aided testimony
provides helpful generalizations for a future analysis of the theory of
repressed memories.
VI. EXAMPLES OF THE FRYE ANALYSIS EMPLOYED BY THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT IN DETERMINING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER "SYNDROMES"
For purposes of this analysis, four cases have been selected in
which the Washington Supreme Court has applied the Frye analysis to
determine the admissibility of evidence derived from the application of
a scientific theory or principle. In two cases examining battered
woman syndrome and battered child syndrome, the court found the
syndromes to be sufficiently accepted in the relevant scientific commu-
nity to admit expert testimony on the syndrome. 49 In the cases exam-
ining rape trauma syndrome and hypnotically aided testimony,
however, the court found the evidence inadmissible because the theory
or principle had not been generally accepted as reliable and accurate in
the relevant scientific community. 50 Although there are obvious dif-
145. WASH. R. EVID. 702.
146. TEGLAND, supra note 143, at 205.
147. Id.
148. State v. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. 478, 497, 794 P.2d. 38, 48, review denied, 115 Wash. 2d
1025, 802 P.2d 128 (1990).
149. State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984) (battered woman syndrome);
State v. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993) (battered child syndrome).
150. State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987) (rape trauma syndrome); State v.
Martin, 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984) (hypnotically aided testimony).
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ferences between these cases and the theory of repressed memories, the
court's Frye analyses are instructive in analyzing the admissibility of
repressed memory evidence.
A. Battered Woman Syndrome
In State v. Allery,"'5 the defendant appealed her conviction for the
second degree murder of her husband, assigning error to the trial
court's exclusion of expert testimony on the battered woman syn-
drome.' s2 The court looked to the expert testimony offered at trial, law
review articles, and decisions in other jurisdictions, and concluded that
scientific understanding of the battered woman syndrome was suffi-
ciently developed to admit expert testimony on the syndrome."5 3
Defendant's expert was the founder of the sexual assault unit at
Harborview Hospital in Seattle who had done extensive research in the
areas of sexual assault and battered women.' s4 The witness was called
to professionally analyze the behavior and emotional patterns of women
suffering from repeated physical abuse by their husbands and lovers.
She would also have testified that the defendant in this case displayed
the behavioral and emotional characteristics of a battered woman. s
The defense outlined that the purpose for the testimony was to (1)
explain the mentality and behavior of battered women generally, (2)
provide a basis from which the jury could understand why the defend-
ant perceived herself in imminent danger at the time of the shooting,
and (3) explain why battered women remain in relationships that are
both psychologically and physically dangerous. s6
According to the defendant's expert, the battered woman syn-
drome is a recognized phenomenon in the psychiatric profession and is
defined as a technical term of art in professional diagnostic textbooks.
Additionally, she stated that the syndrome is comprised of three
distinct phases, including the phenomenon known as "learned
helplessness."'5S7
The court noted with approval opinions from other jurisdictions
admitting expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome.' 8
151. 101 Wash. 2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984).
152. Id. at 592, 682 P.2d at 313.
153. Id. at 596-98, 682 P.2d at 315-16.
154. Id. at 595-97, 682 P.2d at 315-16.
155. Id. at 595, 682 P.2d at 315.
156. Id. at 596, 682 P.2d at 315.
157. Id. at 596-97, 682 P.2d at 315. Psychologists describe the phenomenon of "learned
helplessness" as a condition in which a woman is psychologically locked into an abusive
relationship with a man because of her economic dependence on him, her abiding attachment to
him, and the failure of the legal system to adequately respond to the problem. Id.
158. Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 315.
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Therefore, the court held that expert testimony that explains why a
person suffering from the battered woman syndrome would not leave
her mate, would not inform police or friends, and would fear increased
aggression against herself would be helpful to a jury in understanding a
phenomenon not within an -ordinary lay person's competence.159
Where the psychologist is qualified to testify about the battered
woman syndrome and the defendant establishes her identity as a bat-
tered woman, the testimony may have a substantial bearing on the
woman's perceptions and behavior at the time of the killing and is cen-
tral to her claim of self-defense. 160
When it subsequently reviewed the admissibility of testimony
regarding the battered child syndrome, the Washington Supreme Court
found the syndrome so closely related to the battered woman syn-
drome, that the same reasons for admissibility applied.
B. Battered Child Syndrome
In State v. Janes,1 6 ' a 17 year old boy was charged with first degree
murder for shooting and killing his stepfather and with two counts of
second degree assault for shooting at police officers and a bystander.
The defendant offered expert testimony regarding the battered child
syndrome to aid in proving his assertion of self-defense.162 In deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony of the battered child syn-
drome, the court reviewed law review articles, a book published on the
syndrome, and its previous decision in State v. Allery (discussed above)
in which the court ruled that evidence of the battered woman syndrome
was admissible. 161
The court noted that the battered child syndrome describes both
the physiological and psychological effects of a prolonged pattern of
physical, emotional, and sexual abuse, and that victims of chronic
abuse often suffer from a general psychological disorder known as post-
traumatic stress disorder. 164
Another key characteristic of the syndrome is known as "learned
helplessness," a characteristic also found in the battered woman syn-
drome.1 65 Both the battered woman and battered child syndromes find
their basis in abuse-induced, post-traumatic stress disorder and elicit
159. Id.
160. Id. at 597, 682 P.2d at 316.
161. 121 Wash. 2d 220, 850 P.2d 495 (1993).
162. Id. at 226, 850 P.2d at 498.
163. Id. at 232-35, 850 P.2d at 501-02.
164. Id. at 233, 850 P.2d at 501.
165. Allevy, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 315.
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similar responses. 166  Given the close relationship between the two
syndromes, the court noted that the same reasons that justified admis-
sion of expert testimony in one, also justified admission in the other. 167
In reviewing the admissibility of evidence regarding rape trauma
syndrome, however, the court did not find sufficient justification to
allow admission of expert testimony.
C. Rape Trauma Syndrome
In State v. Black,168 the defendant was charged with the second
degree rape of his sixteen year old neighbor. The State offered expert
testimony on rape trauma syndrome to prove that the alleged victim
did not consent to sex with her alleged assailant. 169 The supreme court
reversed the trial court judgment, holding that the State had not laid a
sufficient foundatior for the rape trauma syndrome testimony because
the testimony lacked scientific reliability and would unfairly prejudice
the defendant.17
The testimony at issue was given by a counselor for the Lutheran
Social Services Rape Crisis Network in Spokane, Washington. The
counselor held a master's degree in social work and had four years'
experience working with 150 to 200 victims of rape and sexual assault.
The counselor testified that there was "a specific profile for rape vic-
tims" and that the victim in this case fit that profile.171
For guidance in determining the admissibility of the evidence, the
court turned to both the literature on the subject and opinions from
other jurisdictions. 17 2 The court reviewed studies conducted by a
number of authors asserting that victims of rape may display a wide-
ranging variety of symptoms.173
However, the court noted that the one overriding theme permeat-
ing the literature is that there is no "typical" response to rape. 174 As
one commentator observed, "each rape victim responds to and inte-
grates the experience differently depending on her age, life situation,
the circumstances of her rape, her specific personality style, and the
responses of those from whom she seeks support. 17 5
166. Janes, 121 Wash. 2d at 233, 850 P.2d at 501.
167. Id. at 234-35, 850 P.2d at 502.
168. 109 Wash. 2d 336, 745 P.2d 12 (1987).
169. Id. at 337, 745 P.2d at 13.
170. Id. at 338, 745 P.2d at 13.
171. Id. at 338-39, 745 P.2d at 13-14.
172. Id. at 342, 745 P.2d at 15.
173. Id. at 343, 745 P.2d at 16.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 344, 745 P.2d at 16.
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Because the symptoms associated with rape trauma syndrome
embrace such a broad spectrum of human behavior, the syndrome pro-
vides a highly questionable means of identifying victims of rape.
Indeed, as noted by the American Psychiatric Association, the stress
and trauma associated with rape is "merely one type of a larger phe-
nomenon known as 'post-traumatic stress disorder.' "176
The court noted that the issue is not whether rape victims display
certain symptoms, but rather whether the presence of various symp-
toms, denominated together as rape trauma syndrome, is a scientifically
reliable method admissible in evidence and probative of the issue of
whether an alleged victim was raped.1 77 A California Supreme Court
opinion, cited by the court in Black, explains how rape trauma syn-
drome differs significantly from other seemingly similar methods of
proof:
There is, however, a fundamental difference between rape trauma
syndrome and both the battered child syndrome and other scientific
methods of proof that have in the past been evaluated against the
Frye standard of reliability. Unlike fingerprints, blood tests, lie
detector tests, voiceprints or the battered child syndrome, rape
trauma syndrome was not devised to determine the "truth" or "accu-
racy" of a particular past event-i.e., whether, in fact, a rape in the
legal sense occurred-but rather was developed by professional rape
counselors as a therapeutic tool, to help identify, predict and treat
emotional problems experienced by the counselors' clients or
patients.178
Additionally, the court was concerned with criticism of the meth-
odology and reliability of the studies conducted to determine symp-
toms of rape. Among the shortcomings cited were: (1) differences in
definitions and criteria for "rape"; (2) unrepresentative, biased, or
inadequate sampling of victims; (3) inadequate means of eliciting infor-
mation about victims; (4) lack of long-term assessments of victims; and
(5) lack of a control group (i.e., a group of nonraped women) against
which to compare the symptoms observed in rape victims. 179
Thus, as a rule, rape counselors do not probe inconsistencies in their
clients' descriptions of the facts of the incident, nor do they conduct
independent investigations to determine whether other evidence cor-
roborates or contradicts their clients' renditions. Because their func-
tion is to help their clients deal with the trauma they are
176. Id.
177. Id. at 346-47, 745 P.2d at 18.
178. People v. Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984).
179. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 345, 745 P.2d at 17.
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experiencing, the historical accuracy of the clients' descriptions of
the details of the traumatizing events is not vital in their task. i80
The syndrome, at best, might identify persons who had been sub-
jected to a traumatic experience, perhaps even a stressful sexual experi-
ence. However, the syndrome is insufficient to reliably indicate that a
rape has occurred. Therefore, the court concluded that expert testi-
mony on rape trauma syndrome is not a scientifically reliable means of
proving lack of consent in a rape case. 1 ' Additionally, the court noted
that expert testimony on rape trauma syndrome is unfairly prejudicial
because it constitutes an opinion as to the guilt of the defendant,
thereby invading the exclusive province of the trier of fact. 182 While
evidence of emotional or psychological trauma suffered by a complain-
ant after an alleged rape may be offered through lay testimony, the
State may not introduce expert testimony that purports "to scientifi-
cally prove that an alleged rape victim is suffering from rape trauma
syndrome."183
The court concluded by stating that, because the scientific evalua-
tion of rape trauma syndrome has not reached the level of reliability
that would surpass common sense evaluations by a jury, admission of
such evidence would "inevitably lead to a battle of experts that would
invade the jury's province of fact-finding and add confusion rather
than clarity.' 8 4
Similarly, this lack of scientific reliability led the court in an earlier
decision to exclude hypnotically aided testimony.
D. Hypnotically Aided Testimony
In State v. Martin,8  a ten-year-old girl was hypnotized because
she could not remember anything about an alleged incident of first-
degree statutory rape. The court, in accord with recent persuasive case
law and the overwhelming consensus of expert opinion, concluded that
testimony by a witness as to facts that become available after hypnosis
is inadmissible in criminal cases."8 6 The court looked to judicial opin-
180. Id. at 347, 745 P.2d at 18 (citing Bledsoe, 681 P.2d at 300).
181. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 18.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 349, 745 P.2d at 19.
184. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19.
185. 101 Wash. 2d 713, 684 P.2d 651 (1984).
186. Id. at 714, 684 P.2d at 652. The use of hypnotically enhanced testimony in civil cases
has not been addressed by the Washington Supreme Court. In the criminal context, the United
States Supreme Court has held that a per se rule excluding all hypnotically refreshed testimony
infringes impermissibly on a criminal defendant's right to testify on her own behalf. Rock v.
Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
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ions applying the Frye test in determining the admissibility of hypnoti-
cally aided testimony and views of experts in the field, including law
review articles.1" 7
In applying the Frye test, the court noted that it was not so con-
cerned with whether the process was scientific, but rather, with
whether a jury could realistically evaluate the effect of hypnosis.
Absent general scientific acceptance of hypnosis as a reliable means of
refreshing recollection, the court noted that the dangers and possibili-
ties of prejudice should preclude evidence based on the hypnosis. 188
The court refused to adopt a procedure that would allow parties to offer
expert testimony on the effects of hypnosis in each particular case.18 9
After examining views of experts in the field, the court found that
hypnotically induced testimony was an unreliable means of enhancing
recall and that the hypnotic state produces "hypersuggestibility and
hypercompliance in the subject, making the subject prone to sheer fan-
tasy, willful lies, or a mixture of fact with gaps filled in by fantasy." 19°
Additionally, the hypnotized subject is "particularly prone to indulge
in confabulation, the filling in of gaps in memory to please the
hypnotist." '191
The Martin court listed the particular dangers involved in
allowing hypnotically induced testimony at trial:
After hypnosis, neither subject nor expert observer is able to distin-
guish between confabulations and accurate recall in any given case,
absent corroborating evidence.1 92 The subjective conviction in the
truth of the memory after hypnosis eliminates the fear of perjury as a
factor ensuring reliable testimony. Additionally, effective cross
examination is seriously impeded, as the witness cannot distinguish
between facts known prior to hypnotism, facts confabulated during
hypnosis to produce pseudomemories, and facts learned after hypno-
sis. Finally, jury observation may be adversely affected, as the wit-
ness, as a result of the hypnosis, will have absolute subjective
conviction about a particular set of events, whether or not his per-
ceptions are objectively accurate.' 93 It is this tendency toward
immunization from meaningful cross examination in particular that
leads us to conclude that a person, once hypnotized, should be
barred from testifying concerning information recalled while under
187. Id. at 720-22, 684 P.2d at 654-56.
188. Id. at 719-20, 684 P.2d at 654.
189. Id. at 719-21, 684 P.2d at 654.
190. Id. at 721, 684 P.2d at 655.
191. Id.
192. See James Beaver, Memory Restored or Confabulated by Hypnosis-Is It Competent?, 6
U. PUGET SOuND L. REv. 155, 199 (1983).
193. Id. at 200-01.
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hypnosis. Hypnosis in its current state simply does not meet the
Frye standards of reliability and accuracy. 194
Significantly, the Martin court was not analyzing the admissibility
of expert testimony. Rather, the court was analyzing the competency
of posthypnotic witness testimony. The dissenters in Martin asserted
that the Frye test was therefore inapplicable. 19s In his concurring opin-
ion, Justice Brachtenbach stated that the dissenters' approach ignored
the basic theory underlying the Frye test; that is, until a novel process is
proven reliable, it has no place in court: "The reason experts are not
allowed to testify about the results of the scientific process is because
the process itself is not reliable." '196
The process of hypnosis is being used to "enhance" a person's
memory. That enhanced memory is presented to the jury as factually
reliable memory. The direct result of that process is the factually relia-
ble memory, which cannot be disassociated from the hypnosis process
itself.197
Application of the Frye analysis and ER 702 by the Washington
Supreme Court in the foregoing cases may provide helpful generaliza-
tions for a future analysis of the theory of repressed memories.
VII. How THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S PREVIOUS FRYE
ANALYSES MAY HELP TO DETERMINE THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF "REPRESSED MEMORY"
EVIDENCE
The cases analyzed above are not sufficiently identical to the the-
ory of repressed memories to provide a definitive analysis of how a
Washington court should rule on the theory's admissibility. With the
exception of hypnotically enhanced testimony, the claimants in these
cases did not forget or repress facts of the events."9 ' However, in the
absence of opinions from other jurisdictions, we are limited to analo-
gous cases within this jurisdiction and a review of scientific literature in
determining the admissibility of repressed memory evidence. In this
respect, we can extract helpful guidelines from the selected cases to
determine the admissibility of repressed memories such as those
claimed by Jill in the hypothetical at the beginning of this Comment.
194. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at 722, 684 P.2d at 656.
195. Id. at 736, 742, 684 P.2d at 666-67.
196. Id. at 726, 684 P.2d at 658.
197. Id. at 726, 684 P.2d at 658.
198. In addition, the cases analyzed are all criminal cases, whereas the hypothetical poses a
question of the evidence's admissibility in a civil context. As noted in Section IV of this
Comment, however, a Fye analysis is appropriate and applicable in either context.
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A. Recognized Phenomenon or Questionable Means of Identifying
Victims?
Is the theory of repressed memories a recognized phenomenon in
the psychiatric profession? Or, do the symptoms associated with
repressed memories embrace such a broad spectrum of human behavior
that the syndrome becomes a questionable means of identifying
victims?
The battered woman and battered child syndromes were recog-
nized phenomena in the psychiatric profession and described similar
physiological and psychological effects. Conversely, the rape trauma
syndrome failed in the Frye analysis because there was no "typical
response" to rape and the symptoms associated with the syndrome
embraced a broad spectrum of human behavior.
As with symptoms associated with the rape trauma syndrome,
checklists identifying symptoms of childhood sexual abuse embrace a
broad spectrum of human behavior. In the hypothetical, Jill suffers a
variety of symptoms, including depression, guilt, compulsive eating,
and aversion to sexual contact.
Even researchers and clinicians who support the validity of
repressed memories state that the checklists cannot establish that some-
one was sexually abused. Additionally, there is no consensus in the
scientific community at this time -regarding how childhood sexual
abuse might induce a particular symptom in one person and a different
symptom in another.
B. Explanation of Phenomenon Helpful to the Trier of Fact?
Is an explanation of why an individual would completely suppress
a memory of childhood sexual abuse and not recall such abuse until
after therapeutic treatment helpful to a jury in understanding a phe-
nomenon not within the competence of an ordinary lay person consis-
tent with ER 702?
In Allery, the court found that an explanation of why a woman
suffering from the battered woman syndrome would not leave her
mate, or inform police or friends, would be helpful to a jury in under-
standing a phenomenon not within an ordinary lay person's compe-
tence. 99 Similarly, an explanation of why a child suffering from the
battered child syndrome would kill rather than leave the parent or seek
help from others would be helpful to the jury because it too involves a
phenomenon not within an ordinary lay person's competence.200
199. Allefy, 101 Wash. 2d at 597, 682 P.2d at 315.
200. Id.
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Assuming the scientific validity of the theory of repressed memo-
ries is confirmed, an explanation of why and how Jill could completely
repress memories of childhood sexual abuse and accurately recall them
would be very helpful to a jury in understanding a phenomenon
outside of an ordinary lay person's competence.
However, testimony that Jill herself repressed the memory and
correctly recalled it may very well be outside the scope of helpful testi-
mony, infringing on the province of the jury. This distinction was
illustrated in the Stevens case where a caseworker was allowed to testify
that based upon her own experience and training, common behavioral
symptoms generally exist in sexually abused children. 20 1  The
caseworker was not, however, allowed to testify that the children in the
case at bar fit the profile.20 2
C. Therapeutic Device Only or Corroborated Recall?
Is the theory of repressed memories a therapeutic tool to help
identify, predict, and treat emotional problems rather than a tool to
determine the truth or accuracy of a particular past event? Or, do ther-
apists conduct independent investigations to determine whether other
evidence corroborates or contradicts the historical accuracy of an indi-
vidual's recollections of repressed memories?
Rape trauma syndrome was found to be an unreliable scientific
method in part because the task of rape trauma therapists did not
include determining the historical accuracy of their clients' descriptions
of the traumatizing events. Rather than conduct independent investi-
gations to determine whether corroborating or contradicting evidence
exists, rape trauma syndrome was developed by professional rape coun-
selors as a therapeutic tool to help identify, predict, and treat emotional
problems.
The court's analysis in Black is directly analogous to the use of
therapy in cases of repressed memories and, indeed, forms an essential
element in the heated debate within the scientific community. Those
who dispute the validity of repressed memories complain that ther-
apists assume the validity of their clients' memories and that this
assumption has no scientific basis. Therapists who assist in memory
retrieval stress the importance of the retrieval in the healing process,
but not the veracity of the memory retrieved.
There is no evidence that Jill's therapist has taken steps to verify
whether Jill's memories are accurate. Instead, the therapist encouraged
Jill to confront her father to facilitate the healing process.
201. Stevens, 58 Wash. App. at 497, 794 P.2d at 48.
202. Id.
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D. Opinion of Guilt?
Does expert testimony purporting to scientifically prove that
repression exists constitute an opinion as to the guilt/liability of the
alleged abuser and, therefore, invade the exclusive province of the trier
of fact?
Because rape trauma syndrome was found to be scientifically
unreliable, the court in Black stated that expert testimony purporting to
scientifically prove that an alleged rape victim is suffering from rape
trauma syndrome will be inadmissible." 3 Moreover, the court stated
that such expert testimony is unfairly prejudicial because it constitutes
an opinion as to the defendant's guilt, an inadmissible invasion upon
the exclusive province of the jury.204
Arguably, testimony about the scientific viability of the theory of
repressed memories will constitute an opinion as to a defendant's guilt
or liability. If a jury hears expert testimony that memories can be accu-
rately recalled, and Jill testifies to a retrieved memory involving her
father, a conclusion as to her father's guilt or liability logically follows.
Of course, a jury or fact finder may very well disbelieve the accuracy of
Jill's retrieved memory, but this possibility was insufficient to over-
come the court's fears in Black. 05
In the case of rape, one might assume that in addition to expert
testimony that the victim is suffering from rape trauma syndrome,
there might be other corroborating evidence such as the alleged vic-
tim's identification of the defendant and never forgotten facts of the
rape itself. In Jill's case, there is no corroborating evidence and her
memory was allegedly repressed for approximately twenty-one years.
Arguably, there is a real danger here that expert testimony may consti-
tute an opinion as to her father's liability.
E. Sufficiently Reliable Means of Enhancing Recall or Susceptible to
Influence and Distortion?
Is the method of recovering repressed memories a sufficiently reli-
able means of enhancing recall to allow presentation of such enhanced
memory as a factually reliable memory? Or, is the method of recover-
ing repressed memories particularly susceptible to influence and/or
distortion by the therapist's own pre-disposition, expectations, or
intention to use the memories to explain why an individual is exper-
iencing problems?
203. Black, 109 Wash. 2d at 348, 745 P.2d at 19.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 350, 745 P.2d at 19.
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These questions were of great concern to the Martin court where it
examined the views of experts in the field of hypnosis, leading it to
conclude that hypnotically induced testimony was an unreliable means
of enhancing recall and that the hypnotic state produced "hypersugges-
tibility and hypercompliance in the subject. ' 20 6 Additionally, the court
noted that the hypnotized subject was particularly prone to indulge in
confabulation, or the filling in of gaps in memory to please the hypno-
tist. Therefore, in any given case absent corroborating evidence,
neither the subject nor expert observer would be able to distinguish
between confabulations and accurate recall.20 7
The court was also concerned that this result would eliminate the
fear of perjury as a factor ensuring reliable testimony because of the
subject's subjective conviction in the truth of the memory after
hypnosis.208
Similarly, Jill's conviction in the truth of her recovered memories,
absent corroboration, raises the same dangers that concerned the Mar-
tin court. The scientific literature suggests the therapeutic methods
employed by Jill's therapist may have involved suggestive or intrusive
techniques. However, because therapeutic methods may differ, there
may be sufficient safeguards to overcome some of the fears enunciated
by the Martin court.
Extensive pre-trial discovery and cross-examination at trial into
the nature and origin of Jill's memory retrieval, the nature of Jill's ther-
apy, the nature of therapeutic techniques employed, and the training
and background of Jill's therapist, may provide sufficient information
to bolster the credibility of testimony offered by Jill and her therapist.
Other jurisdictions examining hypnotically enhanced testimony
will allow each party to offer expert testimony on the effects of the
hypnosis in the particular case if certain procedural guidelines have
been met.20 9 The guidelines may include that (1) the hypnotic session
is conducted by a licensed, independent psychiatrist or psychologist
trained in the use of hypnosis; (2) all contacts between the hypnotist
and subject are recorded; and (3) written information detailing facts
known prior to hypnosis is obtained from law enforcement officials and
the subject to ensure that the therapist does not add new facts during
the hypnosis session.210
206. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at 720, 684 P.2d at 655.
207. Id. at 722, 684 P.2d at 656.
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., State v. Hurd, 432 A.2d 86, 89-90 (1981), cited in Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at
720, 684 P.2d at 655.
210. Hurd, 432 A.2d at 89-90; Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at 720, 684 P.2d at 655.
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Martin provides conclusive precedent that hypnotically enhanced
testimony is not admissible in this state. However, where a memory of
sexual abuse is not recalled under hypnosis, and assuming that the pro-
cess of repression and accurate recall is proven reliable, allowing dis-
covery of the therapeutic methods employed may be sufficient to
overcome a presumption that the memory has been "tainted" by thera-
peutic suggestions.
F. Victims Incompetent to Testify?
If the method of recovering repressed memories is not a suffi-
ciently reliable means of enhancing recall, should a court determine
that not only experts, but also alleged victims are incompetent to
testify?
Although the Frye test applies to the admissibility of expert testi-
mony, the Martin court held that the alleged victim was incompetent to
testify. In his concurrence, Justice Brachtenbach explained that when
experts are not allowed to testify about the results of the scientific pro-
cess, it is because the process itself is not reliable. Therefore, if the
unreliable process is used to enhance a memory, the enhanced memory
cannot be presented to a jury as a factually reliable memory.211
Similarly, if the process of repression and accurate recall is proven
unreliable, the Martin decision suggests that in addition to precluding
her therapist's testimony, Jill may also be precluded from testifying
about her memories.
G. Battle of Experts?
If the scientific evaluation of the theory of repressed memories has
not reached a level of reliability that surpasses the quality of common
sense evaluation present in jury deliberations, will admission of such
evidence lead to a "battle of experts," invading the jury's province of
fact-finding, adding confusion instead of clarity?
This concern, articulated by the court in Black, is also of concern
in regard to the theory of repressed memories. The literature examined
illustrates that the theory is the subject of intense debate with little
agreement on either side. Certainly, we can assume that Jill's father
will present expert testimony that retrieval of long-repressed memories
is not supported by any scientific evidence. This can only lead to a
"battle of experts," leaving the jury to grapple with questions that the
scientific community itself has been unable to resolve.
211. Martin, 101 Wash. 2d at 726, 684 P.2d at 658.
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Rather than providing testimony helpful to the trier of fact, the
testimony of experts may merely result in highlighting the dichotomy
of opinion in the scientific community.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis indicates a lack of trustworthiness and reli-
ability in the testimony of repressed memories. Therefore, Jill's claim
must fail. The scientific basis of expert opinion on this matter, includ-
ing the principle or procedures through which the expert's conclusions
are reached, are insufficiently accepted in the scientific community to
remove the danger of speculation and conjecture and to provide assist-
ance to the trier of fact. This lack of acceptance in the scientific com-
munity puts at risk any proposed expert testimony and, perhaps, the
proposed testimony of a claimant as well.
A summary of the seven guidelines noted above highlights the
dangers of admitting this type of evidence. With the exception of
being helpful to a jury in understanding a scientific phenomenon not
within the jury's competence, the remaining guidelines support exclu-
sion of the evidence:
1. The syndrome embraces such a broad spectrum of human
behavior that it becomes a questionable means of identifying
victims.
2. Many therapists assume the validity of a repressed memory and
stress the importance of retrieval and healing without con-
ducting independent investigations to determine whether cor-
roborating or contradictory evidence exists.
3. Without corroborating evidence, a danger exists that evidence of
repressed memory syndrome may constitute an opinion as to the
guilt or liability of a defendant.
4. Methods employed to recover memories may involve suggestive
or intrusive techniques, distorting the reliability of the
memories.
5. If an unreliable method is utilized to recover a memory, a plain-
tiff's testimony about a memory may be similarly unreliable.
6. Intense debate in the scientific community regarding the theory
of repressed memories will only lead to a battle of experts.
As noted above, there are a number of safeguards upon which a
trial court may insist in order to enhance the reliability and trustworthi-
ness of repressed memory evidence:
1. that the claimant has verified the nature and origin of the mem-
ory retrieval including the nature of the claimant's therapy, the tech-
niques employed, and the training and background of the therapist;
[Vol. 18:51
Recovered Memories
2. that the claimant's therapist has recorded all contacts between
the therapist and the claimant to ensure that the claimant's memory has
not been "tainted" by therapeutic suggestion;
3. that the claimant has made good faith efforts to obtain cor-
roborating evidence such as school and medical records, testimony of
treating physicians, schoolteachers, friends, and family members; and
4. that the jury is instructed to limit its use of repressed memory
evidence for help in understanding the phenomenon, and not for deter-
mining the guilt or liability of a defendant.
These safeguards, however, are only viable if a trial court can
safely assume that the process of repression and accurate recall is relia-
ble. Absent verification that the process of memory repression and
recall is possible, however, these safeguards alone cannot support
admission of repressed memory evidence, because they do not ade-
quately address the underlying validity of memory repression.
Until the scientific community is able to say that the process of
repression and accurate recall of memories is a reliable and trustworthy
phenomenon, experts can only be expected to inform the trier of fact
that repression may or may not occur, or that the recovered memory may
or may not be accurate. A judge or jury is then left to determine
whether the recovered memory is indeed accurate. However, neither
judge nor jury can be expected to determine whether the process of
repression and accurate recall is reliable when experts in the field have
not yet been able to do so. 212
A rule precluding evidence of repressed memories may be re-
examined, however, if new evidence that seriously questions the lack of
acceptance of the theory of repressed memories within the relevant sci-
entific community is produced. In this regard, this author hopes that
the Washington Supreme Court will be given an opportunity to address
this issue in the near future, and will provide a definitive assessment of
whether the evidence is admissible under the Washington Rules of Evi-
dence. The issue before the court should be whether recall of a
repressed memory of childhood sexual abuse is a reliable method of
retrieving factual information. Therefore, the process itself-repres-
sion and recall-must be evaluated before the product of the process-
the fact of the abuse-is presented at trial.213
212. See id. at 726, 684 P.2d at 660 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring).
213. Id.
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